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Address: Critical Irony, Neo-Authenticity 
and Humour in the Art we Call Public 
 
One of the reasons I was invited to write this 
text was an anecdote attributed to me by Dave 
Beech, one of the editors of this journal. 
Sometime back in the late 90s, Dave has 
recounted, I once said after a few beers in a 
public house that ‘the only art that doesn't' 
have a public is Public Art’. Until recently 
reminded of this – the quote appears on this 
journal’s website – I’d long forgotten that I'd 
said it, and my intended meaning at the time is 
beyond my recall. However, it strikes me now as 
being a concise and pithy-sounding, somewhat 
sarcastic sound bite, typical of a pub 
conversation. At the same time, however, it’s not 
absolutely clear what it means – thinking about 
it, it could be both right and wrong, and in 
different and contradictory ways.  
 
One could in a text on public art have devoted it 
to the impossibility of thinking just such a 
public art. One could have deconstructed the 
distinction between the public and privatised 
sphere in a number of different ways. How, for 
example, in our algorithmically digitised, 
semiocapitalist psychosphere, that cuts across 
the public and private, can we think a distinct 
category of a public art. Both the privatisation 
of public space, within which much usually 
privately-funded public art is installed, along 
with Big Data, surveillance and the internet-
driven evisceration of the interiority private 
domain make it impossible to conceive of any such 
distinctions. With the hyper-spectacularization 
of the art institution, what public work of art 
can have the same impact as the edifice of the 
Guggenheim Bilbao or Tate Modern as in themselves 
total works of public art. Some of the things 
they contain, frame and render visible, both 
within and beyond their dematerialised walls, is 
far more publicly visible than almost any 
examples of public art, precisely because of that 
institutional frame. Regarding he web, what work 
of public art has had more impact in recent years 
than Ryan Trecartin's open-access Center Jenny on 
Vimeo. However, the art we call public still 
exists, and there has never been more public 
sculpture; more of it is installed everyday, and 
these works still address 'us'. So here I wish to 
think about the specific modes of address of 
these works, and the quite radically distinct 
ethics, aesthetics and politics that constitute 
the very ways in which that 'us' is implied and 
inscribed. 
 
Irony, or ‘art about art about art’ 
 
 
Fig. 1: Michael Asher, Project: Installation 
(Caravan), 1977 
 
 
One piece of Public Art that immediately sprung 
to mind when I recounted this was a work that 
I’ve recently been thinking about that does 
indeed illustrate this quote in one particular 
respect. It is not a work that I’ve ever been 
that enthusiastic about but it is one that has 
long since acquired iconic status, and is seen to 
be paradigmatic of certain kinds of interventions 
by artists into the ‘public’ domain. As such it 
is on almost every academic slide list devoted to 
discussions of both Institutional Critique and 
art in the public sphere. The work I’m thinking 
of is Michael Asher’s Project: Installation 
(Caravan), made for the first Munster Skulptur 
Projekt in 1977, and reinstalled every 10 years 
for each subsequent iteration of what is still 
one of the most high-profile displays of public 
and site-specific art works. It consists simply 
of a small holiday caravan installed on its own 
on an ordinary street in the city. An inverted 
Duchampian unassisted readymade in reverse, the 
piece displaces Asher's typical critical concerns 
with the institutional frame of the museum and 
gallery to that of public art as institution. The 
work is a piece of critical meta-art about about 
the impossibility of public art, and is a kind of 
founding statement of its kind. 
 
 
 
 
The Problem With Critical Irony 
 
Asher’s fellow High Priest of ‘Inst Crit’, Andrea 
Fraser, once professed to 'love' the work, and 
cited it as something of an epiphany in the 
development of her own practice. Her words, as 
far as I remember them, were that the work 
demonstrated that 'a work of art has no 
substantive quality that distinguishes it from 
any other object in the world apart from the fact 
that it is the object of a specialised, 
professionalised gaze that singles it out in 
advance as a work of art.i The caravan makes its 
point with Asher's typical concise economy, but 
its point, however, is only amenable precisely to 
the bearer of that specialised, professional 
gaze; it is thus necessarily exclusive. The work, 
in order to make its point, intended to exclude 
the non-initiated; it was designed to be 
invisible to the 'public' at large. Indeed in its 
last installation at Munster in 2007 it was 
intentionally locked up in a garage for 5 weeks.  
 
Freud in his book on jokes referred to irony as a 
means of doing or saying one thing and clearly 
meaning another. (Freud 1960: 181) Like a 
sarcastic in-joke, however, it can only mean, can 
only represent if the audience is prepared in 
advance to 'get' the point of the rhetorical 
utterance.  Irony is knowing, and is dependent 
upon a knowing in advance. In Asher's case his 
work is knowingly positioned in relation to a 
contiguous critical constituency in a way that 
became the blueprint for later critical ‘Kontext 
Kunst’, as it would be called in Germany. It is 
thus 'readymade' in another sense, in that it is 
a putting into practice of a prior critical 
position specifically directed towards a 
readymade 'public'. As much as it site-specific, 
the work is therefore discourse-specific, and in 
many ways the former is dependent upon the 
latter. 
 
Deleuze makes a point regarding irony as being a 
'superior' mode that always arrives in advance 
for the encounter with the Event of art and thus 
misses it; humour, on the other hand, is the art 
of being open to the event-encounter where the 
'intelligence always comes later'(Deleuze 2004: 
30).  Philosophical irony has its roots in the 
Socratic mastery of the Platonic dialectic, 
inaugurating a continuum that extends through 
Romanticism - the early Jena version - up to our 
present-day, post-Postmodern critical negative 
theologies. Regarding the latter, Foucault 
famously stated of Deleuze's distinction between 
irony and humour that 'irony rises and subverts; 
humour descends and perverts'(Foucault 1977: 
165). The ironist rises to a transcendent Idea - 
in our case here these would be Unity and 
autonomous Art - and descends in order to 
critically demonstrate their impossibility, their 
unthinkability. Deleuze describes ironists as 
‘Men of conversation’, and their ‘tone is always 
of the signifier. He constantly goes up and 
down’. Humour is ‘completely the opposite’, 
Deleuze continues, it is, ‘completely atonal, 
absolutely imperceptible, it makes something 
shoot off. It never goes up or down, it is on the 
surface: surface effects. Humour is an art of 
pure events’. Humour takes one to the Outside of 
signification; it aims to stop the ‘good 
conversation’ in its tracks, to confound it in 
favour of producing New questions: ‘the art of 
constructing a problem. None of this happens in 
an interview, a conversation, a discussion’ 
(Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 68). 
 
PUBLIC ART DOES IN FACT ATTEMPT TO 
DEAL WITH NOT ONLY ALIENATION BUT AS WELL 
TO HELP ITS CITIZENS FIND THEIR PLACE IN THE SUN 
 
 Today’s art world is defined precisely by its 
status as a non-stop curator-led talking shop. 
After our recent conversational turn, whole art 
works, whole public art projects, whole Biennales 
can be conceived as ‘immaterial’ conversations. 
However, talking about art, politics and 
political art only takes us so far. Thomas 
Hirschorn has frequently borrowed the following 
phrase from Jean Luc Godard when he refers to 
‘wanting not to make political art but to make 
art politically’. What would such an art ‘look 
like’. Maybe it would not look like anything, 
maybe it would not be the object of recognition, 
or knowledge, or mastery of anyone’s 
professionalized gaze at all. Maybe it would be 
something that rather than being deadlocked in 
the Capitalist Realism of the present would 
actively produce outsides of the present. Such an 
art would incarnate Events, and Events, however 
small or big, render the present pre-posterous  
by producing blocs of duration that contract and 
dilate the present into the past and the future 
of the past or the future past of the present. 
 OVER AGAIN BEFORE 
 
  
Events actively produce a palpable sense of a 
non-teleological futurity disarticulated from the 
deadlocked present (that is tellingly almost 
always prefixed by a post-…). This is precisely 
what no punctual conversation, populated by what 
Nietzsche would have called ‘Men of the present’ 
can achieve. 
 
THEN NOW & THEN 
 
 
 The creation of an untimely event is exactly 
what art does politically that (what passes for) 
politics cannot do. No Event has ever been 
curated into ex-istence.  
 
In recent years there has been a reaction against 
irony in favor of what I’ll refer to here as Neo-
Authenticism’. This has taken the form of a 
rejection of exclusive, academic discourse-
specific, indirect speech in favor of the more 
direct address of a revival of ‘realisms’ (much 
so-called ‘post-internet’ art would fall into 
this category in spite of its ‘medium’ and 
numerous kinds of direct social functionalisms. 
One notable example of this was the first post-
Occupy Berlin Biennale, whose press conference 
notoriously opened with the following curatorial 
announcement: ‘You can sum up my position in one 
sentence: art does not work and art does not 
act’. Since then, no Biennale has been complete 
without curated forms of collective, ‘socially-
engaged’ curated projects, quite often staged as 
supplements to the main event. On the one hand we 
have the persistence of late-Postmodern indirect 
address of the politics of representation‘, what 
Jerry Saltz has called ‘art about art about art’ 
of critical spatial practices, and then a recent 
injunction for art to get ‘real’, which 
represents a return to the representation of 
politics, and/or an art that directly addresses 
the social sphere as literal political 
intervention. The latter, if Art and Education 
website is anything to go by, is a highly 
profitable growth area in art education with new 
MFAs in socially engaged art being announced on 
an almost weekly basis. Much of this, however, 
harks back to very much un-curated activities of 
previous decades, particularly the 70s, and it 
coincides with a compensatory nostalgia for those 
days when such practices could claim to be 
embedded in the social and political movements 
that might have prevailed at the time. 
Disarticulated from these spheres of public-ness, 
though, do such calls to action, in the grander 
scheme of things, and in spite of their laudable 
intentions, amount to anything much more than 
gestures; do they, as is often the case, amount 
more to grand curatorial statements directed 
largely at the art world itself. Take, for 
example, ‘documenta 14’ that recently opened in 
Athens, a project that exceeds my Berlin example 
as being the most emphatic and unequivocal 
injunction to the art world at large to get 
‘real’ and address the Now beyond the confines of 
the art world. Again it is a call made by the 
most arch insiders of the art world  - curators - 
that will inevitably fail to resonate very far 
beyond its borders. However, as I will argue in a 
moment, for me, this might not be the most 
productive way to frame the question of art’s 
political agency in and on the world. 
  
Nevertheless, the dominance of this question in 
the art world over last decade since the 
‘activist turn’ (as I write even current issue of 
Frieze, the Bible for ‘art fair art’, has protest 
art as its main theme) has enabled a largely 
curatorial constituency to secure their place 
atop the moral high ground of an art world even 
more deeply divided around the unproductive and 
moribund binaries of a ‘dependent’ or 
‘autonomous’ art versus a ‘political’ art; and/or 
a disengaged ‘formalism’ versus a ‘socially-
engaged’ would-be praxis. The latter is usually 
prefixed by one of those privileged terms 
‘collective’, ‘group’, or ‘participatory’, which 
is then inevitably pitched against the ‘outmoded’ 
model of the individual author artist - as if 
this and the aforementioned oppositions hadn’t 
been deconstructed to death decades ago.ii 
 
One of the ways in which an art of direct social 
engagement (and therefore an ‘authentic’ 
political art) consolidates its moral superiority 
is via the familiar mechanism of a double alibi, 
which, to paraphrase Hal Foster, goes something 
like this: on the one hand such an art can excuse 
itself from having to be new and confoundingly 
different or self-different as art because it’s 
‘political’ art; on the other, it can excuse 
itself from having to be actually effective as 
politics because it’s ‘political’ art. It can 
therefore get away with being such calls to 
‘real’ action can get away with being 
curatorially ‘radical’ while being aesthetically 
conservative and ineffective as political praxis 
– all the while, we might add, being just as 
dependent upon the category of autonomous art as 
any art-for-art’s sake formalism. 
 
It is, however, hard to argue against the 
moralisms of social engagement, however 
problematic they might be, because one 
immediately risks being cast as a-political, a-
moral. But maybe we should bypass the false moral 
question, forget normative morality and move to 
the much less self-certifyingly safe ground of 
the (undecidable) pragmatics of ethics. Maybe it 
would be much more productive to address the 
question raised by Psychoanalysis since Lacan and 
ask whether they’re right when they argue that 
the ethics of psychoanalytical practice as well 
as art practice might have nothing at all to do 
with the moral ‘service of goods’. Maybe art, to 
cite Blanchot, or Lazzarato is an a-social form 
of social engagement, an un-working that might 
have nothing at all to do with means-ends 
instrumental rationality. Lawrence Weiner has 
frequently reiterated that he doesn’t just want 
his work ‘to be a distraction for people on their 
way to work’, he wants his art to ‘fuck up 
people’s entire lives’(Weiner 2013). This is a 
big claim, but I want to take it seriously. 
However, he’s not addressing just ‘us’ art world 
insiders – we’re hopefully fucked up already. 
Furthermore he’s maybe not addressing ‘us’ as we 
are at all … his art – in its modest but 
effective way – intends to produce Events that 
render us ‘pre-posterous’, that actively 
disarticulate our words from the world of things. 
This might be what what art does politically that 
politics or political art can’t seem to do. 
Events fuck up your everyday life coordinates …  
both irony and authenticity, however, repress the 
event; neither have space or time for the 
untimely encounter. They are ultimately reverse 
sides of the very same coin.  
 
From the outset, Weiner’s art departed from a 
‘contextual’ ‘conceptualism’ founded upon a 
reading of the Duchampian Readymade as an act of 
spatial displacement – of which Asher’s reversed 
readymade taken back into the street is still an 
example – in favor of the Duchamp of the ‘infra-
thin’ time of the Event. Lawrence Weiner and 
Robert Smithson were just such artists who were 
concerned with rendering ‘public’ not an 
abstract, spatialised, clock time of past, 
present and future in linear sequence, but with 
the perverse offspring of Chronos, or Father 
Time, Aieon, who is the 4th dimension of time. 
 
TIME IMPEDED   
 
Bergson argued that logical time is an 
abstraction of the intellect, whereas the 
twisted, perverted time of duration is only 
amenable to sensible intuition. Duration, Deleuze 
argued, incarnates pure difference, which is that 
which is not only different to all others but is 
different from itself.  
 
INSIDE & OUTSIDE OF ITSELF 
 
This conception of art’s self-differential 
specificity (or what an Adornian might call non-
identicality) takes us beyond questions of 
autonomy and its critique 
 
 
Lawrence Weiner has probably been the most 
prolific ‘public’ artist of recent decades; I can 
think of no other artist who has installed more 
works in the spaces we call public than him since 
the late 60s. The mode of address of these works 
is neither ironic nor first-personally sincere. 
Rather, they are humorous, and humour is the art 
of the 4th=personal singular, or free-indirect 
discourse, a kind of reported speech 
unattributable to any identifiable speaker. 
 
I AM OUT OF CONTEXT WITH THE WORK 
 
Weiner has also insisted upon the work’s 
‘universal availability’, that the works are non-
exclusive without at all, as we’ll see in a 
moment, being populist (Weiner 2004: 177). 
 
His text-based works invariably take the form of 
a sequence of words, most often including the 
past participle of a verb, re-petitioned in such 
a way that they are always left incomplete, or as 
Duchamp would have put it, ‘definitively 
unfinished’. His ‘Statements’ always refer to 
what he describes as an ‘established empirical 
fact’ but, at the same time, they are always 
somewhat elliptical, and this in a double sense. 
Firstly, while referring to a completed action in 
a minimally reduced, zero-degree linguistic form 
they nonetheless remain confoundingly and  
paradoxically enigmatic. In the same way as 
Deleuze said of Foucault’s theory of statements, 
or enonces, first published in 1968 - and 
perfectly contemporaneous with Weiner’s book, 
Statements, of the same year - they are 
‘secretive but with absolutely nothing being 
hidden’. Weiner presents words in their raw state 
as ‘some language’, in much the same matter-of-
fact way as his friend and fellow artist, Carl 
Andre, presented raw materials. The infinitive 
character of his statements is often augmented by 
the inclusion of the graphic device of an 
ellipsis or an open ellipse. The latter often 
encircles an indefinite article, an ‘a’, that as 
Weiner has stated, refers to ‘a specific object 
without a specific form’. He has spoken of this 
as his ‘medium’, and how the infinitive and the 
indefinite actively ‘objectifies desire’, how it 
activates our default hard-wired-ness for 
completion and closure, while at the same time 
producing a sense of anticipation and futurity. 
Devoid of any melancholic irony, they are 
actively…pre-posterous in the same sense as I 
have used the term thus far. And being poised 
between something that has happened and something 
about to happen, they are akin to what Deleuze 
and many other thinkers would call an Event. 
An Event is always in the middle; it begins and 
ends in the middle, in the aternal interstice 
between the happened and the about to happen. It 
is never ‘happening’ in the sense that it is 
never a punctual and self-present object of 
recognition. Rather, Weiner’s Event-statements 
suspend language, suspend sense in the aternal 
interstice of the tense-less ‘meanwhile’. 
 
 
Complete nonsense would, however, obviously fail 
to achieve this, and Weiner’s statements work due 
to their perfectly pitched, intensive suspension 
between sense and its absence. As Deleuze again 
states with regard to the ‘logic of sense’, here 
the ‘signifier is floating and the signified is 
floated’(Deleuze 1990: 89). 
 
THE GRACE OF A GESTURE  
 
To Giorgio Agamben, the gesture is a 
fundamentally ethical phenomenon and, moreover, 
it also constitutes the minimum form of the 
political (Agamben 2012). The same would, I’m 
sure go for Lawrence Weiner too. For Agamben, 
poetic language is defined by its status as a 
pure gesture. Pure gestures are a paradoxical 
kind of communication without communication 
consisting of ‘signifiers without signifieds’ 
that are, in this respect, very much akin to what 
Weiner refers to as his ‘non-impositional’ units 
of linguistic interpolation that are poetic 
without being anything like conventional poetry. 
A pure gesture is, like a Foucauldian statement, 
a minimum form of discursivity that nonetheless 
opens up an interface with another, with 
alterity. It does this, though, in a non-
instrumental ‘un-working’ linguistic mode, 
constituting a disjunctive-syhthetic a-social 
kind of sociality, or a relationality without 
relation, quite unlike the ‘relational’ or 
‘participtatory’ aesthetics’ of recent yore.  
 
Neither an exchangeable unit of communication or 
information, nor utter nonsense, Weiner’s works 
are perfectly  
 
PITCHED 
 
Between sense and its absence 
 
BETWEEN DISSOLUTION & RESOLUTION 
(AT A GIVEN TIME) 
 
This is how the works ‘work’. Nonsense would be 
an immediately readable gesture of the refusal to 
engage with the interlocutor, whereas the pure 
gesture intensively suspends signification and 
amounts to an ethical means of ‘fucking up’ the 
interface between our words and the everyday 
world of things in the public sphere.  
 IF IN FACT THERE IS A CONTEXT  
 
Counter-intuitively for such a prolific public 
artist, Lawrence Weiner has stated that he has 
never made a site-specific work in his entire 
career. Rejecting contextualism long before 
Kontext Kunst he has from the outset insisted 
that ‘content is context’. What might this 
content be? It would not be the literal content 
of the statements themselves but the pre-
posterous excess they produce – the eventuality 
of the statements. A useful way of thinking this 
dimension of his work is via another of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s concepts, that of the rhythmic 
Refrain that is developed in their magnum opus, A 
Thousand Plateaus – a concept that Weiner’s work 
uncannily prehends (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 
330-369). The refrain is a theory of rhythm as a 
territorial assemblage and offers a way of 
thinking about how art acts intensively in and on 
the world, how rhythmic assemblages, like the 
birdsong example they deploy, actively de- and 
reterritorialises any given space upon which art 
acts upon.  
 
SCULPTURE BY VIRTUE OF ITS STATE 
PRESENTS A MATERIAL REALITY THAT BY ITS PRESENCE 
CHANGES THE INHERENT MEANING OF WHATSOEVER 
PLACE 
IT FINDS ITSELF 
BRINGING ABOUT A CHANGE IN THE RELATIONSHIPS OF 
HUMAN BEINGS & OBJECTS & PRODUCING A CHANGE IN 
THE AMBIENCE 
CAVEAT EMPTOR: IT CAN SOMETIMES BLOCK THE WAY 
 
Like musical rhythm, the infinitive dimension of 
Weiner’s works is always in the middle; they ex-
ist in the in-between the happened and about to 
happen. Debussy once said something that many 
subsequent musicians have reiterated in various 
ways, that music exists in the space between the 
notes or beats. Music, or rhythm, is the Outside 
of musical form. At more or less the same time, 
Bergson also compared pre-posterous duration to a 
continuous and infinitive melodic flow. When 
rhythm in music really works, really moves the 
listener we lose all sense of linear, spatialised 
time; we ex-ist, lose ourselves in the intensive 
interstice between the still palpable just passed 
and the equally palpable anticipation of the next 
beat. Here, to reiterate presence is folded and 
twisted into the past and the future of the past 
– the future-past of the present. In this way, 
rhythm produces a palpable sense of a non-
teleological futurity in and out of here and now. 
 
THE OBJECTIFICATION OF A MISE EN SCENE 
FOR THE PRESENTATION OF CONTENT 
IS THE RESULT OF THE INHERENT 
MATERIALITY OF BOTH LANGUAGE AND SOUND 
 
Elsewhere in the Refrain, Deleuze and Guattari 
discuss the territorializing function of art. 
They compare the artist to a virtual ‘stage 
maker’, of which are the mark, the poster and the 
placard as functional elements (354). Here, 
perhaps like Weiner, they reclaim an autonomy for 
artistic agency in and on space. This is not 
autonomy in any prior, transcendent sense but as 
something that art actively produces. It is the 
mark or the placard, they argue, that ‘makes the 
territory’. ‘The territory is a function of 
decoding’, they continue, and ‘this demarcation 
constitutes a home, but the home does not pre-
exist. The natal is always outside’(356).  
 
 
 
This already begins to offer us a way of 
rethinking art in the spaces we call public that 
recomplicates and takes us beyond contextualism 
and notions of art as intervention into 
preexisting spaces. And, further on, they compare 
the agency of the artist – one that is again 
uncannily like Weiner – to the public verbal and 
physical gestures of merchants and traders in 
their performative creation of what I have called 
elsewhere ‘pitches’ or ex-centric ambient zones 
in and on but irreducible to ‘context’, ‘market’ 
or otherwise. To cite the Refrain again, the 
centres of these pitches of intensity ‘are 
simultaneously inside the territory and outside 
the several territories that converge upon 
it’(359). 
 
 
 
A SERIES OF STAKES SET IN THE GROUND AT REGULAR 
INTERVALS TO FORM A RECTANGLE TWINE STRUNG FROM 
STAKE TO STAKE TO DEMARK A GRID A RECTANGLE 
REMOVED FROM THIS RECTANGLE 
  
 
If the rhythmic event opens onto the outside of 
linear time, the 4th dimension of time, then what 
Weiner refers to as ambience might be thought of 
as the 4th dimension, or outside, of the three 
dimensions of Euclidean space. As excess of 
linear time and spatial extensity, events are of 
durational intensity but are at the same time, as 
Weiner insists, ‘a material reality’. Ambience 
offers us a different way of thinking Deleuze’s 
notions of the ‘actuality of virtual’ and the 
virtuality of actual, and how art’s function is 
to actualize virtual events within which are 
incarnated future potentialities. 
 
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF NON-PARALLEL REALITIES 
(MULTIPLE REALITIES OCCUPYING THE SAME SPACE AT THE 
SAME TIME) 
 
This is precisely the argument of Franco Berardi 
‘Bifo’ in a recent essay (Berardi 2011). He also 
deploys Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the 
refrain, retournel, or rhythm, and demonstrates 
its vital contemporary politicality through 
showing how rhythm has the capacity to ‘produce 
an autonomy which constitutes the independence of 
social time from the temporality of capitalism’. 
‘Digital financial capitalism has created a 
closed reality, he argues, which cannot be 
overcome using the techniques of politics  of 
conscious organized voluntary action and 
government’.  
Schizoanalysis, of which the refrain is an 
instrument, acts in two ways, Berardi argues: ‘it 
diagnoses the infospheric pollution of the 
psychosphere, but it also provides treatment to 
the disturbed organism. The retournel is the 
sensitive niche where we can create a cosmos that 
elaborates chaos’. The refrain can be 
‘insurrectionary’, he continues, ‘and helps to 
withdraw the psychic energies of society from the 
standardised rhythm of compulsory competition-
consumption and create an autonomous collective 
sphere’. To him, poetry, or art, or music is the 
‘language of movement’ as it deploys a new 
retournel. Counter to the new modes of 
standardisation and submission that subjectivity 
undergoes, produced by network technologies and 
neo-liberal globalisation, ‘refrains are pathways 
of autonomous subjectivisation’, or the 
production of new group subjectivities in and 
through the creation of heterogenous rhythm. 
Rhythmic retournels as instruments of 
schizoanalysis achieve ‘a singularisation and 
sensibilisation of breathing, unchained from the 
congealed pace of the immaterial assembly line of 
capitalist production’. This, to conclude, is 
precisely what art does politically that politics 
cannot. 
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i  This quote from Andrea Fraser is not verbatim because the online recording of a number of 
talks within which she made these statements has been taken offline. Fraser has been 
particularly active in policing her online presence over recent years. I hope that the reader will 
trust that I my citation of these statements is made in good faith. 
ii  Guattari, in 1981: “I no longer have much faith in the specificity  of the  group, and I would even 
say that I believe less and less in the group as an entity’. Most of the time it’s no more than a 
fiction’. Continuing, he argues that ‘  
